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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STEYENS-SALT LAKE CITY,
IXl'.
Appellant,
vs.

RAY WONG, JAi\1 LEO and YEE
TONG HOW, a partnership doing
business as China Tea Garden,

Case No.
7920

Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF· THE CASE
The appellant brought an action against the respondents, alleging that on or about September 22, 1950, the
defendants in the course of conducting their restaurant
business on the second floor of a building located at ll51h
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, negligently
maintained and operated their drainage and water system thereby causing or permitting large quantities of
water to seep through and into the ceiling and walliS of
plaintiff's ladies apparel store, which store is located on
the ground floor of the same building. Due to this inciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dent, the appellant claimed it was damaged and sough)
recovery in that action. The appellant further alleged
that as a result of the water seepage, large section'S of
plaintiff's ceiling and wall plaster fell in on October 12,
1950, requiring large expenditures of money on the part
of the appellant.
The respondents generally denied any negligence on
·their part and raised, by way of an affirmative defense,
contributory negligence on the part of the appellant.
The court instructed the.jury generally on the ques1
tion of respondent'S alleged negligence and on the mea- ·II
sure of damages awardable if appellant was allowed to
recover. The court also instructed the jury as to the
meaning and application of the doctrine of res ipsa
.
loquitur.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant-respondents and against the plaintiff-appellant, no
cause of action. The appellant herein made a motion for
a new trial, which motion wa'S denied. As a result of
such denial, this appeal has followed.
The question then presented in this case is as follows: Where, without warning, a store is suddenly damaged, first by water leaking through their ceiling from
the floor above them and later through the collaP'se of
said ceiling, may a jury find for the defendants whose
failure to act andjor discover the defect in his pipe~
proximately caused the plaintiff's damages~

j

STATEMEN'T OF FACT'S
The respondents in this action, since 1938, have operated as a partner'Ship, a restaurant, known as the China
2
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Tea Garden, located on the second floor of a building
located at 115% South ~[ain Street in Salt Lake City,
l~tah. The appellant, in this action, has since 1943, oper·ated a ladies apparel store on the ground floor of the
before-mentioned building. The appellant is a New York
Corporation doing business in Utah as Stevens-Salt Lake
City Incorporated.
On September :2:2, 1950 or thereabouts, MI"S. Sally
Peers, Manager of the Stevens' store, discovered that
water was running from the ceiling above a portion of
the store (Tr. 103). Upon discovery of the leakage, Mrs.
Peers notified the respondents above, showing them the
leakage and she then ordered that that portion of the
ceiling be roped off (Tr. 103 and 104). The entire 'Store
was closed during the morning of September 22nd. The
roped off portion of the store was closed for the entire
day. The afternoon of September 22nd, all the store
except the roped off portion was open for business. The
roped off department was open for business the next day,
September 23rd.
nirs. Peers testified that water dripped from the
ceiling and wall all that day of September 22nd (Tr. 104).
Sometime later, on or about September 25, 1950, ::t
representative of the respondents called on Mrs. Peers
at the appellant's place of business. Mrs. Peers was told
to have the place "fixed up" at the respondent's expensP(Tr. 105). There is no evidence as to this matter with
respect to what the respondent's representative meant
when he told Mrs. Peers to "fix the place up." Mrs.
Peers testified that prior to October 12, 1950, no platster
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fell from the ceiling (Tr. 105).
Mrs. Peers next testified that due to the leakage, the
ceiling was badly in need of a paint job and that a painter
on two occasions examined the premises with the idea
of having the damaged portions painted. Mrs. Peers
wa'S told it would be advisable to wait until the ceiling
dried to have the painting done (Tr. 105 and Tr. 106).
Before the ceiling dried sufficiently to be painted, the
ceiling collapsed on October 12, 1950 or thereabouts (Tr.
107).
Mrs. Peers testified that she ordered the store closed
on the day the ceiling fell, having been advised, by Mr.
Floyd Goodson, Battalion Chief of the Salt Lake Fire
Department, that it was not safe to keep the store open.
The 'Store remained closed for one week while repairs
were being made (Tr. 107).
It is in the record that a substantial amount of merchandise of the appellant was damaged due to both of
the before-mentioned incidents. It is also in the record,
and need not be mentioned here, that appellant suffered
substantial incidental damages due to the two beforementioned incidents of September 22, 1950 and October
12, 1950.
Mrs. Peern testified that after the portion of the
ceiling collapsed, that merchandise which could conveniently be removed was removed to another part of
·the store. The balance of the merchandise was covered
by a heavy curtain so that it would not be further damaged when the ceiling was replastered (Tr. 123).
Mrs. Peers testified that on or about September 23,

4
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1950, she vi-.:;ited the respondents at their place of bus.
ness. She observed workmen working on the pipes in th(-.
respondenf-s plare of business. Apparently, respondents
ordered the water shut off as there was no more dripping
after Septen1ber :23rd or thereabouts (Tr. 115).
On stipulation by counsel, a clause in a lease between
the owner of the building at 115¥2 South Main Street
in Salt Lake City and the China Tea Garden was admitted in e·vidence. The clause reads, "And the lessee-.:; agree
that they will indemnify the occupants of the ground floor
of said building for any damage sustained by said occupants by reason of negligence of lessees." (Tr. 133).
:Jir. Ray \Yong, one of the re'Spondents in this action,
testified that on or about September 22, 1950, he wac
notified of the leakage in Stevens' Store. He testified
that he found no water in his place of business. He
then ordered the water shut off and at that time, a leak
in the pipe was discovered (Tr. 137).
~Ir. Wong further testified that the pipe had been
installed in 1938, when the China Tea Garden was first
opened (Tr. 138).
On cross examination, Mr. Wong testified that he
didn't know how long the water had been running before
it came through to the downstairs. Mr. Wong testified in
substance that it was necessary to take out the wainscoating from the wall before it could be determined that
the pipe wa-s leaking (Tr. 140). Mr. Wong further testified that the pipe was flush against the wall, having a
wainscoating cover on top of the pipe (Tr. 141).
Mr. Wong's testimony continued as follows:

5
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"Q.

Now, when had that wainscoating been put
in there~
"A. When we opened up.
"Q. When you first opened up~
"A. Yes.
"Q. You didn't do any work on the pipe or wainscoating since 19381
"A. No.
"Q. Which was twelve years before~
"A. No." (Tr. 142).
Mrs. Sally Peers, later in the trial, testified that
when she visited the respondent's place of busine'Ss, she
saw the pipe which had been respon'Sible for the leakage.
She ~estified that, "The pipe was ve-ry corroded and rusty
and it was in very bad condition." (Tr. 146).
Mr. Gerald Rosenberg, president of the appellant
corporation, in his deposition, testified in great detail
as to the extent of the appellants alleged damages, both
direct and indirect and incidental due to the. two incident~S of September 22, 1950 and October 12, 1950 (Tr.
37-102).
QUESTIONS INVOLVED
Five arguments are relied on in this court as ground
for reversal.
1. THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT
TEND TO NEGATIVE THE INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
THAT ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THE PLUMBING
WHICH RELEASED THE WATER FROM OVERHEAD WAS
WITHIN THE COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS, AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS.
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2. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS AGAINST LAW,
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
FROl\1 WHICH T.,HE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY ~EGLIGENT,
BUT EVEN IF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS BASED
UPON ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE
PLAINTIFF, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER IN
SUPPORT OF ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
THE PLAINTIFF UP TO THE TIME WHEN THE WATER
DAMAGE OCCURRED ON SEPTEl\IBER 22, 1950 AND
THEREFORE, AT THE LEAST, THE JURY SHOULD HAVE
FOUND FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO THE EXTENT OF THE
WATER DAMAGE THAT RESULTED ON THAT DATE.
3. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS AGAINST LAW,
INASl\IUCH AS THE JURY DID NOT FOLLOW THE
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6, AND FOUND FOR THE
DEFENDANTS, ALTHOUGH THE COURT INSTRUCTED
THAT THE DEFENDANTS COULD ONLY OVERCOME THE
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IF THEY OFFERED AN
EXPLANATION AS TO HOW THE WATER CAME TO
ESCAPE WITHOUT THEIR FAULT, AND THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT OFFER SUCH EXPLANATION.
4. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3, WHICH ASKED
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT OFFER ANY EVIDENCE THAT
THEY DID ANYTHING TO PREVENT THE DAMAGE, TO
OVERCOME THE INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE RAISED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
5. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4, AND BY SO
DOING THE JURY MIGHT HAVE SPECULATED THAT
THE NEGLIGENCE WAS CAUSED BY THE ACT OF SOME
OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS WHO WERE NOT IN THE
CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS, AND THUS FOUND
FOR THE DEFENDANTS, WHICH THE JURY WOULD
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NOT HAVE DONE IF THE JURY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED
THAT IT MUST FIND FOR THE PLAINTIFF IF THE
NEGLIGENCE HAD NOT BEEN THAT OF SOME OTHER
PERSON OR PERSONS WHO WERE NOT UNDER THE
CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS.
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 WAS
SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE TO INVOKE THE DOCTRINE
OF STRICT LIABILITY. UNDER THIS DOCTRINE, THE
DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE LEAKAGE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PIPE.

ARGUMENT
1. THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT
TEND TO NEGATIVE THE INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
THAT ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THE PLUMBING
WHICH RELEASED THE WATER FROM OVERHEAD WAS
WITHIN THE COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS, AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS.

The appellant contends that the respondent in this
case adduced no evidence whatever which would either
tend to explain why water came to leak through appellant's ceiling without the fault of the respondents or
tend to show that respondents were not negligent in
allowing the water to 'Seep through appellant's ceiling or
discover the leaking water before great damage wa~
done to the appellant.
The record is completely devoid of any evidence
which might explain why the leakage occurred without
the respondent's fault. The only evidence offered by the
respondents which might remotely tend to show they
were not negligent is contained in the testimony of one
of the respondents, Mr. Wong:
8
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··Q.

How long had that pipe been installed if you
know1

·· ~-\..

Since we opened.

··Q. "\Yhen did you open 1
"A.

1938.

··Q. Do you know who installed the pipe 1
··~-\..

The guy that used to call•Tracy; I don't
know where his shop is now. He used to have
a shop at the end of Plumb Alley, I don't
know whether die now.

··Q. "\Yas his name

Tracy~

··A.

Casey.

··Q.

Did you understand Casey was a

"A.

Yes, * * * well, he got a shop in there, a
plumbing shop.

"Q.

What kind of material'S did Casey use, what
kind of pipes did he use putting this itt~

"A.

plumber~

I .don't understand about pipe, he fix all the
plpe.-

-

"Q. Was it your understanding what kittd of pipe
he should use~
"A.

He should use good pipe.

"Q. And do you know whether he had ne·w pipe
or notf
"A.

I don't know; I don't understand pipe.

"Q. Did you pay for it on the basis that he would
use new pipe~
"A. Well that is what we pay." (Tr. 138-139).
On the basi'S of the above testimony alone, can it be
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said that the respondents produced at least some evidence
to show that they were not negligent~ The appellant
contends that this evidence standing alone, could not be
taken as any evidence to show that respondents were
not negligent. At be'St, all this evidence shows is that
when respondents moved into their place of business,
water and plumbing pipe was installed. There was no
evidence even going to prove the pipe was new when purchased and installed; and there was no evidence whatever going to show what quality the pipe was. There i'S,
however, evidence in the record which shows that from
1938 until the first incident occurred in September of
1950, the pipes were never examined or inspected by
anyone (Tr. 142).
The later decisions in this state seem to stand for
the proposition that the doctrine of re'S ipsa loquitur,
when applicable, gives rise to an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, which justifies but does not
necessarily compel a verdict in favor ·of the plaintiff.
White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 102 Pac. 2nd 249; Jenson
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 Pac. 2nd 958;
Angerma;n Co. v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 290 Pac. 169.
The facts in the case at hand pres en ted a re'S ipsa
loquitur situation, and the trial court correctly instructed
the jury that the doctrine was applicable (Court's Instruction No. 6). Therefore, in this case, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur being applicable, an inference was
raised that the defendant~ were negligent. The defendants, now respondents, offered no evidence in rebuttal
to explain why the incidents occurred without their fault,

,

4

J
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and they offered no real evidence that they were not
negligent in allowing the water to flow and in not discovering the flow before substantial injury was inflicted
upon the plaintiff-appellant.
This court has recognized that the inference arising
under -the ma..um res ipsa loquitur may and will vary
in 'Strength, and that under son1e circumstances, and especially in the absence of evidence by the defendant, may
be so strong as to compel a finding of negligence. Jordan
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Utah, 218 Pac. 2nd 660, at
page 663 ( l'tah 1950); White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, at
page 488, 108 Pac. 2nd 249, at page 251; Z occolillo v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 Utah 39, at page 63, 177
Pac. 201, at page 211; and Angerman Co. v. Edgemon, 76
Utah 394, 290 Pac. 169, at page 171. The appellant feels
that the inference which arose in this case was so strong
that the jury was, as a matter of law, compelled to find
in the appellant's favor. Due to the nature of the injury,
appellant wa'S unable to show any direct, specific acts
of negligence on the part of the respondents. However,
the evidence is all in support of the inference that defendants were negligent. There is evidence in the record
that respondents never inspected the pipe which caused
the mischief since it was installed, 'SOme twelve year8
before (Tr. 140). There is also evidence in the record
to show that the pipe in question, when examined, after
the first incident of September 22, 1950, was in a danger. ous and defective condition (Tr. 146). One of the respondents te'Stified that he was not even sure if the person who was hired to install the pipe was a plumber.
11
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He further testified that he had no idea what kind or
quality of pipe was, in fact, installed (Tr. 138-139).
It then appears in this case that the inference of
negligence raised by the factual application of the doctrine of re'S ipsa loquitur was strongly supported by all
the evidence·, which could have possibly been adduced
under the circumstances of the case. On the other hand,
the respondents, defendants below, brought in no evidence whatever either going to show they were not negligent or going to explain how the injury came about without their fault. rrherefore, the appellant now contends
that the finding of the jury was against the law and the
evidence, and a'Sks that the decision reached in the trial
court be reversed upon this ground.
One of the most recent Utah cases which applies
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is Whit-e v. Pir~~ney, 99
Utah 485, 108 Pac. 2nd 249. In that case, the court instructed the jury that res ipsa loquitur was applicable,
but refused to instruct the jury that defendant was
guitty of negligence as a ma:tter of law. Plaintiff
contended that he was entitled to such an instruction
where the above doctrine was applicable. The court, in
holding the instruetion was properly refused said, "This
court is committed to the view that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur doe'S not give rise to a legal presumption
of negligence but justifies the fact finder to infer negligence."
The court goes on to say, ''In certain cases if no
explanation of the accident is offered, the situation may
forceahly impel a finding of negligence." In this case,

~
.:'l

~

·j

·~l

~
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plaintiff strictly relied on the doctrine while defendants
offered 'Substantial evidence to show they were not negligent. The jury brought in a finding of no cause of action.
The c~urt goes on to say, '"Or, to put it another way,
have defendants successfully overcome the inference of
negligence which would have been drawn at the close of
plaintiff's evidence so as to render a verdict for defend~
ants the only reasonable one~" Thus, the court in this
case says that even though the doctrine gives rise only
to an inference of negligence, such inference, though
not strong enough to entitle the plaintiff to an instruction
that the defendant is guilty of negligence as a matter of
law, is 'Strong enough, in certain cases, to compel the
jury to find for the plaintiff if the defendant'offers no
evidence to show his absence from negligence and even
compels a jury finding in favor of the plaintiff wher~
only a scintilla of evidence is offered by the defendant
to prove his absence from negligence. This last quoted
statement, taken with the court's earlier 'Statement that,
in certain cases, the doctrine alone may compel a jury
finding in favor of the plaintiff, bears out appellant's
assignments of error in this case: that the jury finding
of no cause of action, was supported by neither the law
nor the evidence.
Later in White v. Pinney, the court 'States the law
as it now exists in this state. "In cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, the inference of negligence applies the want of proof of negligence, and the
defendant is under the duty of rebutting this inference
of negligence rather than evidence of negligence." Later
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in thi.'S opinion, the court goes on to say, "* * * And as
the facts be more within the knowledge of defendant
than of plaintiff, the burden of the evidence, of goin~
forward, is shifted to the defendant to show that he
was not guilty of negligence.- In bearing this burden the
defendant need not show that he used every precaution,
care or skill to prevent the happening of the accident.
It is sufficient if he shows that he US'ed the degree of
care commell'surate with the dangers which men of prudence would have anticipated under the circumstanceR.
In the instant case, defendants made a showing sufficient
to present a question of fact for the jury." The case is
41
then authority for the proposition that the doctrine gives
rise to an inference of negligence, which the defendant
must somehow rebut to even present a question of fact
for the jury. If the inference is in no manner rebuttedno evidence being adduced by defendant-it would be
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to direct a
verdict in the plaintiff's favor. By the same token, even
if a directed verdict is not requested, as no real question
of fact is presented for the jury's deliberation, the jury
would be compelled to find for the plaintiff. However,
even if the defendant does offer a scintilla of evidence
to rebut the inf·erence, it its contended that generally in
other cases and specifically in the case at hand, the evidence in rebuttal was so weak that a finding of no cause
of action was not supported by the evidence. To this
extent, the early cases of Williamson v. Salt Lake and
Oregon Ry. Co., 172 Pac. 680 and Zocolillo v. Oregon.
Short LineR. Co., 177 Pac. 201 were overruled by impli-
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cation in White v. Pinney. 'rhese two early ca'S·es held
that in n1ost cases where res ipsa loquitur was applicable,
the jury might con1pletely disregard the inference even
where the defendant offered no evidence in rebuttal.
This rule has never been supported by the weight of
authority of courts throughout the United States. In
38 Am. Jr. 310 at page 1007, the law as it exi'Sts in the
great majority of jurisdiction in this country is stated
as follows: "Conclusiveness of presumption or inference
-the presumption or inference of negligence herein considered is, of course, a rebuttable presumption. It imports merely that the plain tiff has made· out a prima
facie case which entitles him to a favorable finding unless
the defendant introduces evidence to meet and offset
its effect."
To the same effect is Michner v. Hutton et al., 265
Pac. 238, a California case. Here the California court
'Says that the maxim res ipsa loquitur gives rise to an
inference of negligence, which inference may not be disregarded by the jury, but must be weighed against the
evidence adduced by the defendant to prove his absence
fromnegligence. Thus, a finding in favor of the defendant must have support in the evidence.

In the above case, the court cites with appro;val
Housel v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 139 Pac. 73, a California case, where it is said, "The pre'Sumption (or inference) that the injury was caused by the negligence of
the carrier, which is raised upon the proof by the plaintiff that he was injured while being carried as a passenger, is itself a fact which the jury must con'Sider in
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determining its verdict, and which, in the absence of
any other evidence, in reference to the negligence, necessitates a verdict in favor of the plaintiff."

•

In the dissenting opinion in Curby v. Bennett Glas.~
and Paint Co., 99 Utah 80, 103 Pac. 2nd 657, the disosenters, after holding res ipsa loquitur to be applicable,
say, "It therefore put upon the defendant the duty of
explanation." The court then says that defendant's
explanation was not sufficient to overcome the inference
of negligence raised by the doctrine. "* * * To me, that
is not a satisfactory explanation, and if resort to the
rule of res ipsa loquitur is needed, then we oshould apply
it." It is seen that the dissenters in this case felt that
the inference raised by the doctrine could not be abandoned at will, and where a finding is returned in favor of
the defendant where the maxim does apply, such a finding ios subject to reversal unless the finding has at least
some evidence in the record to support it. It is submitted that in the case before the bar, the jury's finding
in favor of the defendants was in no manner supported
by the record.
In Angerman Co., Inc. v. Edgem.on et ux., 76 Utah
394, 290 Pac. 169, a case, on its facts, very similar to the
case at hand, the trial court inostructed the jury that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable, and the
jury found for the plaintiff. As in the case at hand, in
the case cited above, the facts made out a case for the
application of the doctrine, and the defendants offered
no explanation as to how the water came to escape or as
to why it was permitted to flow for osuch a length of time
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and in such vohune as to find its way down through tht
plaintiff'~ ceiling and upon the goods in the plaintiff's
store. The court states, .. It was still the duty of the defendant to use due care to discover the trouble and to
stop the overflow and prevent the water from causing
injury to the plaintiffs goods. vVhether they used due
care or not in this respect was a question of fact for th~
jury to find frmu all the facts and circumstances shown
in evidence in the case." It follows that in the case at
hand, the respondents offered no evidence whatever
that they used due care in discovering the trouble to
prevent the ac-eident of September 22, 1950, so that the
finding of no cause of action had no support in the
record and was, for this reason, erroneous. Later in
this opinion at page 173, the court implies that where
the doctrine applies, and the defendant offers no ·explanation of how the accident happened without his fault,
the inference of defendant''S negligence is brought to
bear. Then, even if defendant offers evidence of his
freedom from negligence, though this creates a question
for the jury, the defendant's evidence of freedom from
negligence may he so weak and insufficient as to compel
a finding favorable to the plaintiff. The appellant contends that this was the situation here, and even if it be
conceded that the defendants offered 'Some evidence to
show their absence from negligence, such evidence was
so weak and insufficient as to make a finding for the
defendants opposed to the weight of the evidence.
2. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS AGAINST LAW,
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
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FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT,
BUT EVEN IF THE VERDICT OF rrHE JURY WAS BASED
UPON ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE
PLAINTIFF, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER IN
SUPPORT OF ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
THE PLAINTIFF UP TO THE TIME WHEN THE WATER
DAMAGE OCCURRED ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1950 AND
THEREFORE, AT THE LEAST, THE JURY SHOULD HAVE
FOUND FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO THE EXTENT OF THE
WATER DAMAGE THAT RESULTED ON THAT DATE.

The appellant first contends that there was not sufficient evidence offered by the re'Spondent from which the
jury would be justified in finding that the plaintiff was
in any manner or at any time contributorily negligent.
As to any possible contributory negligence on the
part of the appellant after the incident of September
22, 1950, leading up to the incident of October 12, 1950,
the appellant contends that it was under a duty only
to exercise the degree of care that a reasonable person
would exercise under similar circumstances, and that
the evidence in thi'S case is that no reasonable person
could have foreseen that the plaster would fall, and that
there is no evidence to sustain a claim of contributory
negligence on the part of the appellant. On the other
hand, there is evidence in the record going to show that
appellant's conduct in the manner was in every sense
prudent. Mr. Earl, a plastering contractor, testified tha.t
where a ceiling is damaged by water, the u'Sual and
customary procedure is not to immediately try to repair
it but to wait until it dries to ascertain. the damage.
This was exactly wltat the appellant did, but before the

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

· ceiling had dried, it collapsed on October 12, 1950 ( Tr.
130). Therefore, a finding by the jury that appellant
plaintiff below, was contributorily negligent after the
incident of September 22, 1950 was not supported by the
record.
If it be conceded that the jury could have reasonably
found for the defendants on the basi'S that plaintiff
was contributorily negligent after the incident of Septernber 22, 1950, still there was no evidence anywhere remotely in this case in support of any contributory negligence of the plaintiff up to the time when the water
damage occurred on September 22, 19·50. It follows that
at the very least the jury should have found for the
plaintiff to the extent of the water damage that resulted
on that date.
· 3. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS AGAINST LAW,
INASMUCH AS THE JURY DID NOT FOLLOW THE
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6, AND FOUND FOR THE
DEFENDANTS, ALTHOUGH THE COURT INSTRUCTED
THAT THE DEFENDANTS COULD ONLY OVERCOME THE
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IF THEY OFFERED AN
EXPLANATION AS TO HOW THE WATER CAME TO
ESCAPE WITHOUT THEIR FAULT, AND THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT OFFER SUCH EXPLANATION.

In Karren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 225 Pac. 1094, this
court said, "Juries may not without reason overturn legal
presumptions or arbitrarily disregard positive state( ments of witnesses." The appellant contends that this
,. was what the jury proceeded to do in the cas~ at hand.
For apparently no rea'Son, the jury disregarded the
·~
Court's Instruction No. 6 when there was no evidence
offered by defendants either going to explain why the

~ .'!
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accident happened without their fault or going to show
that the defendants were not negligent. Therefore, the
finding of the jury of no cause of action was opposed
to the Court's Instruction No. 6 and thus was against
the law.
In Knell v. Morris, 234 Pac. 2nd 1025 at page 1029,
the California Court says, "It was the duty of defendant
Mac Mar to exercise ordinary care to keep the heater
in a reasonably safe condition so that water should not
be permitted to escape and cause injury to the property
of the occupant of the floor below. This duty was not
limited to conditions actually known to be dangerous,
but extended al-so to conditions which might have been
found dange,rous by the exercise of reasonable care."
In this case, the def·endant Mac Mar was in the exact
~~n!:le position as the respondents in this case. He was
the tenant above the plaintiff, who'Se goods had been
damaged by the seepage of water from a defective pipe.
From the rule of this case, it follows that the respondents were under a duty to use due care to keep the pipes
in a reasonably safe condition so that water would not
be permitted: to es0ape and cause damage to the goods
of the tenant below. Whether the re-spondents used due
care or not would ordinarily have been a question for
the jury, but here as there was an inference that due
care had not been used and as there was some direct
evidence tending to show due care was not used and as
respondents offered no evidence whatever to show due
care wa'S used, any finding by the jury in favor of the
~
respondents was not supported by the evidence.
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4. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQl'ESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3, WHICH ASKED
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT OFFER ANY EVIDENCE THAT
THEY DID ANYTHING TO PREVENT THE DAMAGE, TO
OVERCOME THE INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE RAISED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.

As mentioned before, the appellant contends that
the respondents offered no evidence whatever either
going to show that respondents were not negligent or
going to explain how the incidents in question here might
have happened without the respondent''S fault. The appellant feels that it was entitled to have the jury instructed
to the effect that defendants in the lower court produced no eYidence which tended to explain how the accidents occurred without their fault and that no evidence
was offered by the defendants below tending to show
they were not negligent. Even conceding that the, jury,
in this case, was entitled to reject the inference of negligence entirely (which the appellant does not concede),
still the appellant wa:s entitled to have the jury apprised
of the fact that defendants below offered no evidenc·:~
which might tend to rebut the inference.
5. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4, AND BY SO
DOING THE JURY MIGHT HAVE SPECULATED THAT
THE NEGLIGENCE WAS CAUSED BY THE ACT OF SOME
!·
OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS WHO WERE NOT IN THE
CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS, AND THUS FOUND
FOR THE DEFENDANTS, WHICH THE JURY WOULD
f NOT HAVE DONE IF THE JURY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED
!' THAT IT MUST FIND FOR THE PLAINTIFF IF THE
• NEGLIGENCE HAD NOT BEEN THAT OF SOME OTHER
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PERSON OR PERSONS WHO WERE NOT UNDER THE
CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS.
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INS1,RUCTION NO. 4 WAS
SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE TO INVOKE THE DOCTRINE
OF STRICT LIABILITY. UNDER THIS DOCTRINE, THE
DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE LEAKAGE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PIPE.

The appellant contends that the court should have
instructed the jury to the effect that there was no evidence in the case which even remotely tended to show
that if the accidents were due to the negligence of some
party, that they were due to the negligence of any party
other than respondents. By failing to give such an
instruction, the jury might have felt that they were
authorized to speculate that the accident might have
be'en caused by the negligent conduct of some party besides the respondents. As there was no evidence in the
case tending to lend weight to such a speculation, the
jury would not have been justified in reaching such a
conclusion.
The appellant contends that the doctrine of strict
liability was applicable to the case at hand. Under this
doctrine, the defendants are liable for all damages proxirnately caused by the defective instrumentality under
their control. Appellant's Requested Instruction No. 4
was sufficiently definite to enable appellant to now invoke
the doctrine and claim that the failure of the trial court
to give the instruction was erroneous due· to the applicatj on of the doctrine of strict liability.
In 60 A.L.R. 475, the case of Horace W. Green v.
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is di~
cussed and annotated. This ease was decided by the
California Supre1ne Court in 1928, an~ it still remains
one of the leading caoses in the United States, which deals
with the doctrine of strict liability. At page 480 in volume
60 of A.L.R., the California Court says, "Where one,
in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise· lawful
and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known
conditions, and, with knowledge that injury might result
to another, proceeds and injury is done to the other a~l
the direct and proximate consequence of the act, however carefully done, the one who does the act and cause'S
the injury should, in all fairness, be required to conlpensate the other for the damage done." In this case,
appellant's oil. well had "blown up" and 'Scattered oil and
debris all over the land of the respondents. The trial
court had given the respondents, plaintiffs below, a
directed verdict on the ground that defendants were
absolutely liable. The Supreme Court of California, in
this case, held that the directed verdict was properly
allowed. The court goes on to say, "In our judgment,
no other legal con'Struction can be placed upon the operations of the appellant in this case tlran that, by its deliberate act of boring its well, it understood the burden
and responsibility of controlling and confining whatever
force or power it uncovered." The appellant contends
that the facts in the case at bar made out a case for the
application of the doctrine of liability without fault.
The respondents, by their act of bringing on to their
premi'Ses the water and plumbing pipe which caused tht~

General Petroleum Corporation, :270 Par.
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eventual mischief, undertook the burden and responsibility of controlling and confining the water in the pipe
which was under high pressure; thus, even if it be conceded that the respondents were not negligent, the appellant was entitled to prevail in the trial court as a matter
of law due to the application of the doctrine of liability
without fault.
CONCLUSION
Briefly stated, the appellant feels that the verdict
of the jury in favor of the defendants had no 'SUpport
whatever in the record, and the verdict for reasons
stated at length in the brief, was opposed to the law as
it exists in Utah and throughout the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. The appellant feels that
the court and the jury wrongfully construed the inference ari'Sing from the application of the maxim res ipsa
loquitur, and finally the appellant feels that the verdict
was opposed to the law because the facts in this case
made ou t a case for the application of the doctrine of
liability without fault.
Respectfully submitted,
WHI'TE, WRIGHT & ARNOVITZ,
Attorneys for Appellant.

24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

